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The capacity of visual working memory is limited to no more than four items. At the same 
time, it is limited not only by the number of objects, but also by the total amount of information 
that needs to be memorized, and the relation between the information load per object and the 
number of objects that can be stored into visual working memory is inverse. The objective of the 
present experiment was to compute visual working memory capacity for emotional facial 
expressions, and in order to do so, change detection tasks were applied. Pictures of human 
emotional facial expressions were presented to 24 participants in 1008 experimental trials, each of 
which began with a presentation of a fixation mark, which was followed by a short simultaneous 
presentation of six emotional facial expressions. After that, a blank screen was presented, and after 
such inter-stimulus interval, one facial expression was presented at one of previously occupied 
locations. Participants had to answer if the facial expression presented at test is different or 
identical as the expression presented at that same location before the retention interval. Memory 
capacity was estimated through accuracy of responding, by the formula constructed by Pashler 
(1988), adopted from signal detection theory. It was found that visual working memory capacity 
for emotional facial expressions equals 3.07, which is high compared to capacity for facial 
identities and other visual stimuli. The obtained results were explained within the framework of 
evolutionary psychology. 
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Amongst various methods in the field of visual working memory capacity 
research, the most common procedure is the change detection paradigm. The 
method usually comprises two successively presented displays of stimuli, divided 
by an inter-stimulus interval. These two displays, which might have differed in one 
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segment during inter-stimulus interval, are presented to participants, whose task is 
to answer if they are identical or not (Rensink, 2002). Accuracy and speed of 
responding are then measured and analyzed together with other relevant variables, 
depending on the research design. One of the first scientists who investigated visual 
working memory by applying such a paradigm was Phillips (1974), who conducted 
several experiments in which he had tachistoscopically presented displays filled 
with dots. Each trial in his pioneering experiments consisted of two displays, 
separated by a variable inter-stimulus interval. The two displays could either be 
identical, or could differ in the addition or the removal of one dot, and participants' 
task was to detect if such a change had occurred or not during inter-stimuli interval 
within each trial. Phillips (1974) found that the performance was excellent with 
short inter-stimuli intervals (100 ms or shorter), while prolongation of the retention 
interval resulted in decreased change detection accuracy. Besides that finding, he 
also discovered that insertion of a mask between two displays causes impairment in 
performance only in conditions with short inter-stimuli intervals, while with longer 
intervals masking has practically no effect. Accordingly, Phillips (1974) attributed 
excellent performance with short retention intervals to iconic memory, and 
proposed that visual working memory is responsible for longer retention interval 
performance. He concluded that iconic memory has a vast capacity, but very short 
duration, in contrast to visual working memory, which is capable of storing only a 
small amount of information, but can keep it for a longer period of time. These 
conclusions by Phillips (1974) are still valid.  
On the bases of Phillips’ (1974) experiments, Pashler (1988) made an 
important contribution in the field of visual working memory-span research. 
Pashler (1988) was the first author who managed to develop a reasonably valid 
method of visual working memory capacity quantification. His procedure, which is 
going to be presented in detail later, was derived from signal detection theory, and 
has been used in the majority of later studies, aim of which was the estimation of 
visual working memory capacity for different types of stimuli. Four of such studies 
are crucial for the understanding of the present study: Vogel, Woodman, & Luck’s 
(2001), Wheeler & Treisman’s (2002), Alvarez & Cavanagh’s (2004) and Eng, 
Chen & Jiang’s (2005). 
Vogel et al. (2001) measured visual working memory capacity for simple 
features and for conjunctions. To estimate capacity for simple features, they flashed 
arrays of 1, 2, 3, 4, 8 or 12 colored squares to participants for 100 ms. Each trial 
contained two displays of stimuli, separated by 900-ms blank interval, with a 
restriction that the number and location of stimuli could not change within a trial. 
Two arrays within each trial could either be the same, or could differ in color of 
only one square, and participants' task was to detect this kind of changes. Their 
performance was almost faultless for displays containing three or less squares, but 
their accuracy started to decline systematically at set size of four items. When 
different types of stimuli were used, and duration of retention interval was varied, 
PSYCHOLOGICAL TOPICS 20 (2011), 3, 489-502 
 
491 
results remained the same, and according to Pashler's (1988) method, Vogel et al. 
(2001) computed that visual working memory capacity equals approximately four 
objects, regardless of their type.  
Vogel et al. (2001) even demonstrated that storage of multi-feature objects does 
not consume more visual working memory capacity then storage of single-feature 
objects into visual working memory. In one of their experiments, they directly 
compared memory for objects defined by one simple feature to memory for that 
same objects defined by a conjunction of features. In all conditions they used bars 
as stimuli, and each stimulus in any of the conditions was defined by color and by 
orientation. In one condition, participants had to memorize only the color of bars; in 
another condition, they had to memorize only the orientation; and in the last 
(conjunction) condition, they were required to memorize both, color and 
orientation. In the conjunction condition, either the color or the orientation of only 
one item could change, while in the other two conditions, only color or only 
orientation of one item could alter. Therefore, in the conjunction condition, in sets 
of four objects, participants had to memorize eight features, while in the other two 
conditions they were required to store only four features. Vogel et al. (2001) found 
no difference in performance between these three conditions, and concluded that 
objects are stored into visual working memory as integrated units, similarly as 
verbal working memory stores information as chunks. Accordingly, they proposed 
that visual working memory capacity is not limited by the number of features, but 
by the number of objects. In one of their experiments, Vogel et al. (2001) 
demonstrated that at a set size of four objects, participants managed to retain 16 
features distributed across 4 multi-feature objects equally well as 4 features 
distributed across 4 single-feature objects.  
However, Wheeler & Treisman (2002) disagreed with Vogel et al.'s (2001) 
conclusions, after they had failed to replicate their results. Wheeler & Treisman 
(2002) believed that visual memory capacity depends on the complexity of visual 
material, similarly as verbal memory capacity depends on the complexity of verbal 
material (e.g. Baddeley, Thomson, & Buchanan, 1975; Schweickert & Boruff, 
1986). Specifically, Wheeler & Treisman (2002) proposed that the number of 
elementary features that define objects affects visual working memory in a similar 
manner as, for example, long words consume more memory capacity then short 
words. One of the experiments in their study was composed of four conditions, 
with single-colored squares as stimuli. In all four conditions, objects were initially 
presented in duration of 150 ms, and in 50% of trials a change could occur during 
retention interval. The type of change depended on experimental condition. In the 
first condition, only the color of two squares could change. In the second condition, 
only the location of two squares could change. In the third condition, either the 
color of two squares, or the location of two squares could change, while in the last 
condition (binding condition), all colors presented, and all locations occupied 
remained the same, but colored squares could swap location. Participants were 
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informed about all these possibilities. These four conditions were blocked, and each 
block of trials was presented in counterbalanced order. Analyses indicated that 
participants' performance was the worst in the condition in which colors had 
swapped their locations, and therefore, Wheeler and Treisman (2002) concluded 
that information about color and location were not automatically bound together as 
Vogel et al. (2001) had proposed, but into separate parallel stores instead. 
Besides Wheeler & Treisman (2002), Alvarez & Cavanagh (2004) also 
disagreed with Vogel et al.'s (2001) model and reexamined it. Specifically, they 
checked Vogel et al.'s (2001) conclusion that the total number of features to be 
remembered is not the factor which determines visual working memory capacity 
for multi-feature objects. Alvarez & Cavanagh (2004) investigated whether visual 
working memory capacity is limited by the number of objects that need to be 
stored, or by the total amount of information that needs to be memorized, and for 
that purpose six classes of stimuli were used: Chinese characters, colors, letters, 
random polygons, shaded cubes and Snodgrass & Vanderwart's (1980) line 
drawings. The amount of visual information was assessed by measuring processing 
rate in visual search tasks for different kinds of stimuli, because the more visual 
information that must be analyzed per object, the slower the processing rate is. 
Alvaraz & Cavanagh (2004) found inverse relation between the information load 
per object and the number of objects that can be stored into visual working 
memory. In other words, they found that visual working memory capacity is 
limited by the total amount of information, and this kind of a trade-off between the 
complexity of objects and a total number of objects that can be stored in memory, is 
clearly contrary to Vogel et al.'s (2001) theory. 
In order to directly test Vogel et al.’s (2001) versus Wheeler & Treisman’s 
(2002) and Alvarez & Cavanagh’s (2004) theory, Švegar & Domijan (2007) 
conducted a research using lines defined by length (long/short), orientation (0º, 45º, 
90º and 135º), and color (red, green, blue), as stimuli. They presented pairs of 
displays containing four such objects, divided by 900-ms retention interval, to 
participants. The experiment consisted of two conditions, and in all trials of both of 
the experimental conditions, only two or none of the features could change during 
the retention interval. In the first condition, two features of only one object could 
change, and in the second condition, the change was distributed over two objects 
(one feature per object). If objects are stored into memory as integrated units, as 
Vogel et al. (2001) had suggested, then participants should have made less errors in 
the condition when two objects had changed. However, analyses showed no 
differences in performance between these two conditions, and that result suggested 
that features are separately stored into visual working memory, in conformity with 
Wheeler & Treisman’s (2002) theory. The conclusions of Švegar & Domijan 
(2007) are also in conformity with the model of Alvarez & Cavanagh (2004), 
according to which, visual working memory capacity is limited by the total amount 
of information, rather than by the total number of objects.  
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Besides their central finding that visual working memory capacity is limited by 
the total amount of information that needs to be stored, Alvarez & Cavanagh's 
(2004) results also indicated that in terms of the number of objects, visual working 
memory capacity differs across different categories of stimuli – it varies from 1.5 to 
4.5 objects. When estimated by Pashler's (1988) method, visual working memory 
capacity equals 1.57 items for shaded cubes, 2.04 for random polynoms, 2.76 for 
Chinese characters, 3.65 for letters and 4.43 items for colors (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 
2004). 
In a study similar to Alvarez & Cavanagh’s (2004), Eng et al. (2005) used a 
change detection task to measure visual working memory capacity for six types of 
stimuli of different complexity (colors, letters, polygons, squiggles, cubes, and 
faces), and found that the estimated capacity decreased for more complex stimuli, 
suggesting that perceptual complexity was an important factor in determining 
visual working memory capacity. In the condition of prolonged exposure of stimuli 
(3000 ms), Eng et al. (2005) discovered that visual working memory capacity 
equals approximately 2 items for faces and cubes, 2.5 items for squiggles and 
polygons and 3.5 items for colors and letters.  
The aim of the present study was to estimate visual working memory capacity 
for emotional facial expressions, and compare it to the capacity for other types of 
stimuli, specifically to the capacity for facial identities. Therefore, in contrast to the 
study of Eng et al. (2005) in which neutral facial expressions of different people 
were used as stimuli, in the present study facial identity was held constant within 
trials, while emotional expressions varied. 
The processing of facial emotional expressions is usually investigated via 
visual search tasks, dot probe paradigm, eye-movement monitoring, backward 
masking of stimuli and similar methods. Various studies using these procedures 
have shown that recognition of emotional states of other people is one of the most 
important purposes of human perception. One of the most frequent findings 
emerging from such experiments is the conclusion that detection of angry facial 
expressions is prioritized by our cognitive system, because detection of facial threat 
is an evolutional advantage (Calvo, Avero, & Lundqvist, 2006; Fox, Russo, Bowles 
& Dutton, 2000).  
Each emotional expression is determined by several facial micro expressions 
and, at the same time, different emotional expressions share communal micro 
expressions. For example, frightened and surprised expressions share two mutual 
features – opened mouth and widely opened eyes, while facial expressions of 
disgust and anger are both characterized by lowered eyebrows which are also 
pulled together towards the root of nose. Thus, facial emotional expressions, as a 
stimuli class, can be considered as rather complex and therefore visual working 
memory capacity for emotional expressions is expected to be low.  
 
  






Twenty-four psychology students from University of Rijeka, Croatia, 
participated in the experiment (age range 20-26). The number of male and female 
participants was equal, and all of them gave the informed consent and reported to 
have normal or corrected to normal visual acuity. 
 
Instruments and stimuli 
 
Stimuli presentation and data collection were controlled by a PC-computer. 
Stimuli were displayed on a 17-inch monitor with resolution of 1024 x 768 pixels 
and responses were collected by keyboard.  
Calvo & Lundqvist's (2008) adaptations of facial stimuli from The Karolinska 
Directed Emotional Faces (KDEF) database (Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998), 
together with stimuli from The Averaged Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces 
(AKDEF) database (Lundqvist & Litton, 1998) were used in the present study. 
Every participant went through four experimental sessions, and was exposed to 
only one set of stimuli per session. Each set of stimuli was comprised of seven 
pictures displaying six emotional expressions (frightened, angry, disgusted, happy, 
sad and surprised) and a neutral expression. In order to keep idiosyncratic facial 
features constant, pictures within a set differed only by facial emotional expression, 
while facial identity was held constant within each set. In other words, each set of 
stimuli contained different facial expressions of the same model, so the only 
variable aspect of stimuli within each set was the emotional expression. Color was 
removed from Calvo & Lundqvist's (2008) adaptation of KDEF stimuli, while the 




Each of four sessions was composed of 252 experimental trials and lasted for 
approximately 30 minutes, so in order to ease such a difficult activity, participants 
took 7-days break between two experimental sessions. Therefore, every participant 
went through a total of 1008 experimental trials. 
Every trial began with the presentation of a fixation mark, in duration of 250 
ms, which was followed by the presentation of the initial stimuli display that 
subtended 13.29 º x 12.27 º of visual angle. The initial stimuli display consisted of 
six different facial expressions, each of which occupied 3.38 º x 2.58 º of visual 
angle. When generating initial stimuli displays, six pictures were randomly pulled 
from a set of seven pictures, with the restriction that two or more identical 
expressions could never be present at the same display. These six facial expressions 
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were then randomly located at six spatial positions. After being exposed for 2000 
ms, the initial stimuli display was erased and blank screen was presented for 500 
ms, and after that the test display appeared. Single test displays were used in this 
experiment, which means that only one facial expression was presented per test 
display, and it was placed on one of six locations previously occupied in the initial 
display. In half of all trials (all trials containing no change), facial expression of the 
test face was the same as the expression of the face previously occupying its 
location in the initial display, while in the other half of all trials (all trials containing 
a change), the facial expression presented at test display was the expression which 
was not presented at all at initial display (Figure 1).  
After the presentation of the test display, participants were instructed to hit the 
"1" key if a change occurred (if the emotion in the test display differs from the 
emotion occupying relevant location in the initial display), or to hit the "0" key if a 
change did not occur during the retention interval (if the emotion in the test display 
is the same as the emotion presented at the relevant location in the initial display). 
They were emphasized to aim for accuracy, not speed, and instructed to respond by 
chance in trials in which they were uncertain if a change had occurred or not. 
Immediate feedback followed each reaction. If the response was correct, the 
word "correct" appeared in blue color at the centre of display, and if their answer 
was wrong, then the word "incorrect" was presented in red color. The experiment 
was conducted in a self-paced manner – after the presentation of feedback, which 
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Visual working memory capacity was quantified by Pashler’s (1988) method. 
The procedure is adopted from signal detection theory, and it is applicable in 
change detection tasks in which one or none of stimuli may change during the 
retention interval between two successively presented displays. Analogously to 
signal detection theory, each change detection task has four possible outcomes: hit 
(change occurs and observer detects it), miss (change occurs, but observer fails to 
detect it), false alarm (change does not occur, but observer reports it occurred) and 
correct rejection (change does not occur and observer correctly reports it had not 
occurred). Only hits and false alarms (together with set size) are relevant for 
Pashler's (1988) formula. Hit rate is a proportion of ''change present'' answers in all 
trials containing a change. Analogously, false alarm rate is a proportion of ''change 
present'' answers in all trials that do not contain a change. It is important to 
emphasize that a hit may not occur in trials that do not contain a change, and 
analogously a false alarm may not occur in trials containing no change.  
Supposing that participants held a certain amount of items in memory, when 
one of them changed, hit would follow, but if the changed item was not stored in 
memory, miss would occur. When participants did not detect a change, they would 
answer "change absent", but it must be taken into account that in a certain 
proportion of the trials they were guessing. Guessing is here the synonym for false 
alarms, which occurs when "change present" answer is given in trials that do not 
contain a change. Along with the variables mentioned and set size, Pashler (1988) 





CH *−+=  
C  is visual working memory capacity; 
H  is hit rate; 
IP  is total number of items presented in a display; 
FA  is the guessing rate or false alarm rate (the proportion of no-change trials in 
which the subject guesses that there was a change); 
(C / IP)  is the proportion of trials in which an item that is stored in memory 
changes; 
(IP – C)  is the number of presented objects that are not stored in memory; 
(IP – C) / IP  is the proportion of trials in which an item that is not stored in 
memory changes. 
 
Thus, Pashler (1988) presumes that the probability of a hit (H) equals the 
proportion of correct detections of a change in cases when changed item was stored 
in working memory (C / IP), added up with guessing. When the equation above is 
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In order to estimate visual working memory capacity in the present study, hit 
and false alarm rates were first computed, and then entered into the equation above, 
separately for each participant. To obtain a hit rate, total number of hits was divided 
by the number of all trials containing a change separately for each participant. 
Analogously, for computing false alarm rate, the number of false alarms was 
divided by the number of all trials that do not contain a change, for each participant 
separately. Mean hit rates equaled 0.66 (SD=0.07) while mean false alarm rates 
equaled 0.29 (SD=0.09). When these values are entered into Pashler’s (1988) 
equation, the formula revealed that mean visual working memory capacity for 






Visual working memory capacity for emotional facial expressions equals 3.07 
items. Thus, we can store, retain and process information of about three facial 
expressions simultaneously in our visual working memory. However, this result 
must be interpreted with caution because external validity of this conclusion is 
questionable since no other experiments were conducted so far in order to assess 
visual working memory capacity, but nevertheless, the obtained estimate of 
memory capacity is very high compared to capacities for other classes of stimuli. 
While capacity for the simplest possible visual stimuli, such as colors, ranges 
between 3.5 to 4.4 items (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Eng et al., 2005; Vogel et al., 
2001; Wheeler & Treisman, 2002), the capacity for emotional expressions is just 
slightly lower. When compared to memory capacity for facial identities, memory 
capacity for emotional expressions is superior. While information of only 2 facial 
identities can be held in memory (Eng et al., 2005), information of 3 facial 
expressions can be retained. Even though the results of Eng et al.’s (2005) 
experiment and the findings of the present study are not directly comparable due to 
some methodological differences, superiority of memory capacity for facial 
expressions over memory capacity for facial identities could even be 
underestimated because of these methodological distinctions. For example, in the 
present study, memory capacity of 3 items for emotional expressions was obtained 
with exposition of stimuli in duration of 2 seconds, while memory capacity of 2 
items for facial identities in the study of Eng et al. (2005) was yielded under 
condition in which the exposition lasted for 3 seconds. When the exposition of 
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stimuli in the study of Eng et al. (2005) was shortened to 1 second, then the 
memory capacity for facial identities was decreased to 1.5.  
So, why does our cognitive system assign great importance to facial emotional 
expressions and prioritizes them even over facial identities? From an evolutionary 
point of view, the capability to recognize the emotional state of other people is one 
of the most important purposes in human perception, because perceived and 
expressed emotional states govern the undertaking of action, and can even be 
critical for survival. Perceived emotions are thus an important factor for social 
behavior and for the entire human cognition: from decision-making and problem 
solving to intelligence. In everyday interaction, we continuously monitor and 
interpret emotional expressions of other people, and the face reveals an ocean of 
social signals and is the dominant medium for transmitting emotional information 
(Knapp, 1978). 
For example, since rapid response to a presence of potential threat in the 
environment is an obvious evolutional advantage, fast detection of facial expression 
of anger has large adaptive value. Fast detection of facial threat is thus assumed to 
be prioritized by our cognitive system in order to initiate immediate action (Calvo 
et al. 2006; Fox et al., 2000). There is a lot of empirical data supporting this 
presumption, especially in studies using visual search tasks (Calvo et al., 2006; Fox 
et al., 2000; Hansen & Hansen, 1988; Horstmann & Bauland, 2006) or dot probe 
paradigm (Mogg & Bradley, 1999). 
On the other hand, some authors argue that distressing emotional experience of 
a person attracts attention, regardless of whether it represents danger or not. 
Therefore, according to their standpoint, angry faces do not capture attention only 
because they represent danger, but also because they show negative affect. Thus, 
the negativity hypothesis presumes that a sad face should be prioritized as well as 
an angry one, when compared to positive expressions (Calvo et al., 2006), and that 
standpoint also received experimental support (Eastwood, Smilek, & Merikle, 
2001; Hahn & Gronlund, 2007; Horstmann, 2007).  
Also, Martin, Williams, & Clark (1991) argue that positive emotional 
expressions can capture attention as effectively as negative ones, and that 
standpoint is called the emotionality hypothesis. According to the emotionality 
hypothesis, special attention is paid to all emotional events, while neutral 
expression are not prioritized by our cognitive system (Calvo et al., 2006; Fox et 
al., 2000). The emotionality hypothesis received support from various experiments 
using visual search tasks and eye-movement monitoring paradigm (Calvo et al., 
2006; Fox et al., 2000; Williams, Moss, Bradshaw, & Mattingley, 2005). For 
example, all emotional faces receive first eye-fixation more often than neutral 
faces, and also, all emotional faces are more likely to be re-fixated than neutral 
ones, which reveals late attentional engagement on emotional faces (Calvo et al., 
2006). Besides that, search performance is better for emotional faces among neutral 
distracters compared to neutral targets among emotional distracters (Williams et al., 
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2005). There are also several studies (particularly speed recognition and backward 
masking studies) indicating the superiority of happy over neutral facial expressions 
(Esteves & Öhman, 1993; Hugdahl, Iversen, & Johnsen, 1993; Leppänen & 
Hietanen, 2004; Milders, Sahraie, & Logan, 2008; Palermo & Coltheart, 2004). 
Their findings, which follow the idea that smiling is a behavioral mechanism 
crucial for cooperative interactions (Mehu, Grammer, & Dumbar, 2007) are also in 
accordance with the emotionality hypothesis. 
When all previously mentioned findings are considered together with the 
conclusion of the present study, it is plausible to presume that high visual working 
memory capacity for emotional expressions is the result of evolutional 
development, because assigning high priority to emotional facial expressions is 
adaptive for observers. We clearly benefit from detecting, recognizing and 
memorizing the location of emotional faces in a crowd, because these processes 
prepare us for the undertaking of necessary actions. For example, fast detection of 
angry faces allows us to rapidly respond to a presence of a potential threat in the 
environment. On the other hand, if we are directed towards happy expressions, we 
have a better chance to initiate a productive cooperative relationship, romantic 
intercourse or other beneficial social interaction. Thus, the capability to recognize, 
encode and retain information about emotional facial expressions in visual working 
memory has large adaptive value and is an important evolutional advantage. 
Prospective research should be directed towards examination of external 
validity of the findings obtained in the present study, by conducting additional 
control experiments, using stimuli from some other sets of emotional facial 
expressions, in which variables such as set size, retention interval and exposition 
interval would be manipulated with. Also, it would be valuable to conduct an 
experiment in which performance in visual search tasks and change detection tasks 
would be directly compared for emotional facial expressions and facial identities. 
By doing so, a much more precise insight about the nature of relevant underlying 
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